Philosophy 100

Fallacies assignment. A fallacy is just a mistake in reasoning. Study some of the fallacies discussed here. Find a fallacy committed somewhere in the media and write up an explanation of how it is a case of a formal or informal fallacy. (I'd recommend starting with Ad hominem, straw man and false dichotomy). 5 points. Due Oct. 28.

Due Monday, November 9. Explain the Ontological argument in a paragraph or two. (5 points)

From our subjective point of view it seems that we have some measure of control over our lives. We form our own opinions about how things are and what matters. We deliberate about what to do based on our values and beliefs. And then we act in accordance with our will as a result of these deliberations. Of course we can't will and do whatever we want. The laws of biology prevent me from simply willing not to drown if I'm submerged in water long enough. But we seem to be in control of things like what to do Friday night, what to buy at the grocery store, what major to pursue in college, who to marry or commit to, etc.

These intuitions would not have struck anyone as problematic until a view of the world as functioning like a great machine emerged during the scientific revolution. According to the physics of Galileo and Newton, events in the natural world were not purposeful or goal oriented (as they were on Aristotle's physics), but rather, they were the product of prior causal conditions and deterministic laws of nature. The rock falls because it is causally determined to by the universal law of gravitation and the absence of countervailing forces. More generally, an event is causally determined when prior causes are sufficient for its occurrence; when, given the prior state of the world and the causal laws at work in the world, that event could not fail to occur. Determinism is the view that all events in the natural world are causally determined. This would include the actions of people. But this appears to conflict with our intuitions about free will. In thinking that we have some control over our lives, part of what we suppose seems to include the notion that we could have done otherwise. If our actions are causally determined, however, then we couldn't simply have done otherwise. Determinism appears to rule out our having free will.

Explain the problem of free will and determinism.
Why does indeterminism (as in the case of quantum physics) fail to do much to help the cause of free will?
What mistake is a dualist view prone to make in addressing the problem of free will by appeal to a “ghost in the machine”?
The compatibilist proposes we understand free will in a manner that is compatible with determinism being the case. How can this be done? Explain a compatibilist conception of free will.
What roles to praise, blame and discipline play assuming soft determinism?
Explain the puppets and the martians counterexamples to Blackburn’s first compatibilist definition: A subject acted freely if and only if she could have done otherwise in the appropriate sense. The subject could have done otherwise in this sense provided she would have done otherwise if she had chosen differently.

Balckburn’s revised revised compatibilist definition incorporates Spinoza’s idea that the degree to which we are free has much to do with how well we know and understand things. On this note, we discussed how critical thinking skills enhance a persons freedom and how poor critical thinking skills render a person vulnerable to intellectual manipulation. I urged everyone to get acquainted with some informal fallacies. Here's a link that should help:

http://www.fallacyfiles.org/taxonomy.html

Why think freedom is linked to our knowledge and understanding?
What is the political and ethical significance of human freedoms connection to knowledge and understanding?
Explain Strawson’s concern that the compatibilist view of human freedom may be dehumanizing.
How does Blackburn think the compatibilist ought to reply to Strawson’s concern?

Blackburn begins this chapter with the problem of other minds. This is another skeptical problem, but a much more specific one than the global skepticism that Descartes' takes on. Even supposing that I have empirical knowledge of things in the external world including human bodies and human behavior, how can I know that other humans have minds like mine? I have knowledge of my own mind by direct acquaintance. I consciously experience my own mental states. But I do not have this kind of access to the minds of others. This stark disparity of available evidence between my knowledge of my own mind and of the minds of others gives rise to the skeptical problem of other minds.

The problem of other minds is acute for mind/body dualists like Descartes. Descartes is a substance dualist, meaning he takes the mind to be composed of fundamentally different kind of substance than the body. The body is made up of physical matter, which Descartes takes to exist in space and time and be governed by deterministic laws of nature. The mind, on the other hand, is of a spiritual substance that exists independent of time and space and has free will.

In his Dualism, Descartes is attempting to reconcile a scientific view of the world with his Catholic religious world view. The fit is not a good one and this can be seen in a couple of ways. Blackburn focuses on epistemological problems of skepticism that arise from his dualism. The problem of other minds for dualism can be understood in the way that dualism allows for the possibility of "zombies" and "mutants"

Descartes' mind/body dualism also gives rise to some intractable metaphysical puzzles. For starters, it is something of a mystery how the immaterial mind with free will can ever have any influence over the body if the physical bodies motions are causally determined by other physical events. Yet it seems that mental events do cause physical events. I mentally will to raise my arm and my physical arm goes up. Likewise, physical events have effects on the mind. Things happening in the external world impact my senses and the result is a mental representation, a perception, of the physical world. But how does this interaction between the mind and the physical world occur where the mind is of a fundamentally non-physical substance? This concern about Descartes' dualism was most famously and forcefully raised by one of the all to rare female voices in the 17th century, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia.

Blackburn addresses the mind/body interaction problem via a debate between Locke and Leibniz about whether "God's good pleasure" plays a role in coordinating mental and physical events.

To help get the lay of the land, here the possible views about the nature of minds:

Substance Dualism: The view the mind and the body are composed of fundamentally different kinds of substance. Advocates include Descartes.

Property Dualism: This view takes the to be just one kind of substance, presumably matter, which has both physical properties and in some cases mental properties. According to Property Dualism, mental properties are not reducible to physical properties. Advocates include the contemporary philosopher of mind David Chalmers.

Idealism: Idealism is a monist view, meaning it takes there to be only one kind of substance, and for the idealist, the one kind of substance is mental. George Berkeley is the best known advocate of this kind of view. Berkeley doesn't deny the existence of ordinary objects like books and chairs, he rather takes such objects to be bundles of perceptions. Berkeley does deny that anything exists independent of minds. But books and chairs can exist independent of our minds as ideas in the mind of God.

Physicalism: This view takes minds to be physical phenomena. Physicalist views about the mind have devloped over the years from the Logical Behaviorism of the early 20th century, through identity theory, the view that mental states are identical with brain states and functionalism, the view that mental states are functional states of the brain.

According to Wittgenstien's argument against private languages, the Mutant and Zombie possibilities also apply to our own past. When we think we are experiencing things the same ways we have in the past, we must suppose that our memories are not deceiving us.

Suppose that dualism is false and that minds are physical. Perhaps the mind can be identified in some way with the brain, or perhaps the entirety of nervous system. In this case, skepticism about other minds can be addressed by examining the biology of minds. If minds are brains and biology show that other people have brains like mine, then I have empirical grounds for thinking that they have minds like mine. So physicalism about minds offer a path to addressing skepticism about other minds. Of course, physicalism about minds raises many more questions than it answers. If minds are brains, then we should want to know just how it is that massive networks of neurons realize mental states like beliefs, desires, emotions, perceptions, imaginary representations and so forth. The good news is that these are scientific questions and we can draw on the resources of biology, neurophysiology and other disciplines in answering them. In fact, in recent decades, the physicalist hypothesis about mind has become the foundation of an ambitious new science of mind where the findings of brain scientists are becoming integrated with the efforts of philosophers of mind, information scientists and other researchers

This chapter in Think begins with a discussion of Descartes' first two meditations. You should read these and you will find them here. Descartes' project here is to provide a "rational reconstruction of knowledge. He realizes that many of his opinions are false and he thinks that the way to rid himself of false beliefs and have greater assurance of the truth of what he knows is to identify those beliefs he can be absolutely sure of and then show how all that he knows can follow from these.

Blackburn offers some critique of Descartes' reasoning beginning with questioning the validity of this argument: The senses sometimes deceive us. So, for all we know, they always deceive us.

See the top of p. 26 if you are worried that Descartes' is just loony with his doubting.

While Descartes thinks he can indubitably know of his own existence, knowledge of what he is is a more difficult matter. Here is a note that will help with the following two questions:

In the second meditation, Descartes finds it odd that on the one hand he can have certain knowledge of his own existence with having much knowledge about his own nature while on the other he seems to have pretty clear knowledge about the nature of everyday objects without having certain knowledge of their existence.

Assignment: (Due Friday Oct. 2) For up to 10 points, answer the following bullet about Descartes' piece of wax in 1 to 2 pages (typewritten, double spaced). Write clearly and concisely. The first few points here will provide further guidance. I'm not asking for any evaluation of Descartes' argument, just a clear statement and explanation of it.

By the end of the second meditation, Descartes has identified his indubitable foundational beliefs. These include only his belief in his own existence as a thinking being and beliefs about the contents of his own mind. The challenge at this point is to build up from this foundation and show how all that he ultimately knows can be justified on the basis of this narrow foundation. His first step is to answer the evil demon hypothesis by arguing that God exists and is not an evil deceiver. In doing so, he helps himself to a principle he thinks he can trust on the grounds that it is "clear and distinct". This is a real problem as such ideas are not foundational and and Descartes is not entitled to their use at this point. This problem is that basis of "the Cartesian Circle".

Descartes' rational reconstruction of knowledge ultimately fails and the legacy he leaves us consists of a difficult skeptical problem. Blackburn briefly examines a few alternative approaches to the problem of justifying our beliefs. These include empiricist foundationalism, and coherentism, or holism about justification. Finally, there is always the option of throwing in the towel and accepting skepticism.

Empiricist foundationalism and coherentism are still vulnerable to skeptical worries like the evil demon hypothesis. I'll wrap up this discussion by pointing out two underlying assumptions of Descartes' project and how rejecting at least one of these might help in dealing with skeptical threats.

One assumption is that the justification for a belief must be certain in order for us to have knowledge. But perhaps knowing only requires have a true belief and a pretty good, but not entirely certain justification. If the existence of an external world and other minds provides a much better explanation of our experiences and beliefs than the evil deceiver hypothesis, we might be thus armed with a pretty good, though less than certain reason for believing in the other minds and an external world. Could this be enough for knowledge? In In Defense of Pure Reason, UW philosopher Larry Bonjour argues for a variety of rationalism which holds that some beliefs are justified through reason alone, but questions Descartes' assumption that reason justifies with certainty. The light of reason provides evidence on this view, but evidence which, like the evidence of the senses, is fallible.

Another assumption that Descartes makes is that knowing requires know that you know. This is must be assumed if justification requires certainty. But we might instead hold that justification only requires that your belief is the result of reliable belief forming processes. This approach to knowledge is known as reliabilism.

Goya, "Imagination abandon by reason produces impossible monsters: united with her, she is the mother of the arts and the source of her wonders"

What does Blackburn have in mind when he speaks of philosophy as conceptual engineering?